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STRICT LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE
Kenneth S. Abraham*
INTRODUCTION
The distinction between strict liability and negligence is a funda-
mental feature of tort law. Tort law theory contrasts strict liability and
negligence by identifying different justifications for each standard.'
Tort law in practice draws a sharp distinction between strict liability
and negligence. Not only is this distinction highly important as a mat-
ter of substance; it seems to be taken for granted that the distinction is
clear and uncontroversial. 2
Bob Rabin has taught us much about the relation between strict
liability and negligence. Through his insights we now understand that
the supposed evolution in the common law of torts from strict liability
to negligence was more nearly an evolution from no liability to negli-
gence.3 And he has shown us how the ideas that underlie enterprise
liability, which are usually thought to be mainly directed at the expan-
sion of strict liability, have influenced the development of tort liability
rules in general.4
In this Article and in his honor, I want to build on Bob's interest in
the relation between strict liability and negligence by examining yet
another aspect of the complicated connection between these two ba-
ses of liability for accidental injury. Liability imposed in negligence
* David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of
Law. Thanks to Vincent Blasi, Gregory Keating, Leslie Kendrick, Peter Schuck, Catherine
Sharkey, and Robert Rabin himself for comments on a draft of this Article.
1. See, e.g., JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORTS 255-56 (2010); WILLIAM
M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 64-73 (1987);
Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055, 1056-57 (1972).
2. One finds little, if anything, in major treatises suggesting that the distinction is questionable
or that the boundary between the two domains is unclear. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBs, 1 THE LAW
or TORTS § 112, at 263-64 (2001) (identifying negligence and strict liability as different bases of
liability); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 536
(W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (noting that strict liability is imposed when the defendant has
not "departed in any way from a reasonable standard of intent or care").
3. See generally Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Rein-
terpretation, 15 GA. L. REv. 925 (1981).
4. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, 55
MD. L. REV. 1190 (1996).
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and strict liability cannot always be as clearly and easily distinguished
as tort theory and tort practice suggest. In particular, some forms of
liability imposed in negligence seem more like strict liability. For ex-
ample, under the objective standard of negligence, liability may be
imposed even when the defendant was not capable of exercising what
amounts to reasonable care. Similarly, under certain circumstances,
reasonable care requires perfect compliance with precautionary re-
quirements. Finally, the "thin-skull" rule imposes liability on a defen-
dant who negligently risks harm to a foreseeable plaintiff even if the
amount of harm this plaintiff suffers is far in excess of what was fore-
seeable. In the first example, the defendant is liable even if he does
his best. In the second example, the defendant is liable unless he
achieves perfect compliance. And in the third example, the defendant
is liable for something he could not foresee. Imposing liability for
negligence in these situations resembles strict liability. At the least,
these forms of negligence liability certainly are "stricter" than many
others.5
The existence of strict liability of this sort in negligence could, in a
sense, be an embarrassment for both tort law theory and practice.
Tort law in practice avoids the potential embarrassment by defining it
out of existence. What actually amounts to strict liability in negli-
gence is virtually never labeled this way in the case law. But saying
that strict liability is negligence does not make it so. Some scholars
have observed that there are "pockets" of strict liability in negligence
law and have proposed explanations for them. 6 Others have denied
that this is strict liability at all.7 I am less concerned with terminology
5. For use of the term "stricter" to describe features of French and German tort law, see CEES
VAN DAM, EUROPEAN TORT LAw 258 (2006).
6. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 128 (noting that, in certain contexts, the
"reasonable-man rule constitutes a pocket of strict liability . . . in negligence law"); STEVEN
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 75 (1987) (describing the imposition of neg-
ligence liability on an "inept person" as strict liability "in effect"); VAN DAM, supra note 5, at
262 (observing that the objective test for negligence is a "kind of strict liability"); Mark F. Grady,
Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 887, 897 (1994) (arguing that
liability for compliance error constitutes "[a] pocket of strict liability within the negligence
rule"); Kenneth W. Simons, The Restatement (Third) of Torts and Traditional Strict Liability:
Robust Rationales, Slender Doctrines, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1355, 1379-80 (2009) (arguing
that negligence contains traces of strict liability and giving examples). But see Stephen G. Gilles,
Rule-Based Negligence and the Regulation of Activity Levels, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 332 (1992)
(arguing that Shavell and Landes and Posner are incorrect because the phenomena they see as
strict liability are all examples of rule-based negligence).
7. See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAw 177-78 (1995) (arguing that strict
liability conforms to neither the objective standard of negligence nor corrective justice); John
C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123,
1144 (2007) (characterizing what I call strict liability in negligence as "compliance luck," or "luck
affecting one's ability to meet a relevant norm of conduct").
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here than with the fact that, whatever these forms of liability may be
called, they are distinctive in certain ways from much of mainstream
negligence and are therefore worthy of separate attention. In what
follows, I will identify the arguments for imposing strict liability gener-
ally, examine the ways in which the different forms of strict liability in
negligence can be explained and justified, and discuss two implications
of my analysis.
The first implication is that negligence is not the pure type of liabil-
ity that it is sometimes thought to be. The existence within negligence
of several forms of liability that are strict, or at least stricter than the
core negligence paradigm, weakens the claim that negligence liability
may have to moral superiority over strict liability. One way negli-
gence has maintained itself, and maintained its dominance of accident
law, is by incorporating stricter liability within it.
The second implication of my analysis is that the normative charac-
ter of tort liability is more complex, and perhaps more ambiguous,
than either rights-based or instrumental theories standing alone can
easily capture. One of the most interesting things about the instances
of strict liability in negligence is that, whether we call them strict lia-
bility or deny them this status, there seems to be widespread agree-
ment that they are normatively attractive." The typical justifications
that instrumentalists give for selectively imposing strict liability apply
fairly comfortably to all three of these forms of liability. Similarly,
rights-based theories of tort law have given or can easily give justifica-
tions for all three. In short, imposing these forms of liability is not
controversial, but what to call them, and how to justify them, is.
This confluence of support on the merits for doctrines whose sta-
tuses are contested suggests that tort law doctrines may need to satisfy
both instrumental and rights-based concerns in order to be stable and
persistent. A negligence system that purports to condition liability on
the commission of wrongs-but also sometimes imposes stricter liabil-
ity for conduct that is not so clearly blameworthy-would seem to be
influenced in practice by the same instrumental considerations that
support the imposition of strict liability. Conversely, instrumental jus-
tifications for tort doctrines are likely to be unpersuasive when these
8. The work of the rights theorists to which I make the most reference in my analysis, Ernest
Weinrib, John Goldberg, and Benjamin Zipursky, is formally positive rather than normative, but
on my reading, has a consistent tone of normative approval of the doctrines that I term strict
liability in negligence. It would be astounding to learn that, after all the energy they have in-
vested in describing the normative structure of tort liability, and particularly negligence law, they
nevertheless object to a significant number of its principal doctrines. As I note below, however,
Goldberg and Zipursky apparently are not as wedded to the thin-skull rule as they are to the
objective standard and the perfect-compliance requirement. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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doctrines do not also satisfy rights-based concerns. For example, de-
spite instrumental arguments for imposing liability in order to pro-
mote deterrence, almost no one thinks that negligence liability should
be imposed regardless of the relation between the defendant and the
plaintiff simply in order to deter risky conduct. Regardless of whether
our system of accident law has mixed "goals," it certainly appears to
be subject to mixed side constraints.
II. THE DISTINCTION AND THE PUZZLE
It would be difficult to exaggerate the extent to which the distinc-
tion between negligence and strict liability is embedded in tort law.
At the requisite level of generality and across a wide range of settings,
the distinction is perfectly valid and easily applied. Negligence is the
failure to exercise reasonable care; strict liability is the imposition of
liability even when reasonable care has been exercised. 9
There has been considerable disagreement in the tort theory litera-
ture regarding what constitutes reasonable care. Rights-based theo-
ries define reasonable care by reference to moral or social norms-the
level of respect and vigilance for physical safety that individuals are
entitled to receive from others and that others owe to individuals.10 In
contrast, instrumentalist theories define negligence as the taking of
socially or economically excessive risk."
More precise description depends on the particular theory being ap-
plied. Some rights theories, such as certain versions of the corrective
justice conception, see negligence liability as reflecting moral respon-
sibility for wrongfully causing loss.12 Other rights theories understand
negligence as a legal wrong rather than a moral wrong' 3 and therefore
as the failure to act with the requisite level of civil competence or
failure to comply with some other social norm.14 For these latter
rights theories, true strict liability, which consists of the imposition of
liability even when the defendant has acted competently and complied
9. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 47, 166 (3d ed. 2007).
10. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999, 2030-31
(2007).
11. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972)
(asserting that the dominant function of the negligence system is to bring about "the efficient-
the cost-justified-level of accidents and safety").
12. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 330-32 (1992); WEINRIB, supra note 7,
at 134-35.
13. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 7, at 1154-56 (identifying reasons why it might be
plausible to see legal negligence as a form of wrongdoing).
14. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 755
(2003); see also Zipursky, supra note 10, at 2033-40.
[Vol. 61:271274
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with other applicable norms, does not really constitute tort liability at
all.15 For the dominant instrumental theories, which apply a
cost-benefit, or "Learned Hand," test for negligence, 16 any liability
imposed when it would not have been cost-effective to take precau-
tions that would have avoided the harm in question constitutes strict
liability.
It is a bit simplistic, however, to treat strict liability as if it were a
single, monolithic notion. On the one hand, there are forms of liabil-
ity that are imposed without regard to negligence and that carry little
or no disapproval. For most commentators, "traditional" strict liabil-
ity for harm caused by abnormally dangerous activities falls into this
category. There is no message implied in the imposition of this form
of liability that the defendant should have behaved differently. Such
conduct does not breach a standard of care. The term "strict liability"
could be reserved for this form of liability alone.
On the other hand, we sometimes use the term "strict" to refer to
forms of liability that do not have the wholly neutral normative va-
lence of traditional strict liability but are not censurable in the same
way as ordinary negligence either.17 If we understand the paradigm
example of negligence to involve conduct that is careless, foolish, or
selfish, and therefore subject to serious (often moral) disapproval,18
then there are a variety of forms of negligence liability that are stricter
than this, regardless of whether we would label them "strict liability"
in the traditional sense. Liability imposed under the objective stan-
dard, the perfect-compliance requirement, and the thin-skull rule fits
this description. The first two forms of liability, especially, often result
from conduct that is not subject to serious disapproval and arguably to
no disapproval at all. In contrast to traditional strict liability, we may
prefer that the conduct not occur, but nonetheless regard the conduct
as inevitable and, for practical purposes, not wholly avoidable. In
contrast to traditional strict liability, this conduct breaches a standard
of care, but even if not justified, the conduct might be excused. Yet,
tort law does not excuse it.
15. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 1, at 267 ("Although by convention, strict liability
for abnormally dangerous activities clearly is part of what lawyers define as 'tort law,' strictly
speaking it does not belong in this department.").
16. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.)
(describing the level of care required as being a function of the burden of precautions, the
probability of loss, and the gravity of the resulting injury if that loss occurs).
17. But see COLEMAN, supra note 12, at 368 ("Ultrahazardous activities are inherently
faulty."); WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 188-89 (arguing that strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activities "is an extension, not a denial, of the fault principle").
18. I am grateful to Vincent Blasi for suggesting this division of the forms of negligence to me.
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Regarding this form of stricter liability as an anomaly, or simply
assimilating liability for this kind of conduct with the negligence para-
digm, ignores both the special reasons we might impose liability for it
and the extent to which negligence liability consists of it. In my view a
good deal of this liability can be explained by reference to the same
set of (admittedly, sometimes controversial) reasons that can explain
strict liability generally. I therefore turn to the theories of strict liabil-
ity that may help us understand strict liability in negligence.
III. THEORIES OF STRICT LIABILITY
There is no single authoritative or canonical statement of the theory
underlying strict liability in tort. A number of courts and scholars
have developed different positive or normative theories that explain
or support strict liability.' 9 It is important to recognize that many of
the arguments for strict liability implicitly accept the notion that some,
perhaps even most, liability for accidental harm should be based on
negligence. But they contend that, in certain contexts, the negligence
requirement does not or should not apply and that strict liability is or
should be imposed. Thus, these are not simply theories about strict
liability; they are theories about the boundary between negligence and
strict liability and about the circumstances under which each approach
is or should be applied.
A. Reducing Information and Error Costs
Determining whether a party has been negligent is often a highly
fact-intensive process. Adducing proof of negligence may therefore
be economically costly and time consuming. For example, showing
how carefully the defendant acted on a particular occasion may in-
19. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Tray-
nor, J., concurring) (identifying the benefits of imposing strict products liability as risk minimiza-
tion, risk spreading, and avoidance of the difficulty of proving negligence); LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 1, at 65-66 (arguing that strict liability reduces information costs, broadens the insur-
ance component of tort liability, and influences the incentives to avoid accidents by reducing
activity levels); Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 1, at 1060 (arguing that strict liability places
liability on the party in the best position to make and act on the cost-benefit analysis between
accident costs and accident-avoidance costs); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2
J. LEGAL S-UD. 151, 169 (1973) ("[C]ausation is the tool which, prima facie, fastens responsibil-
ity upon the defendant."); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L.
REv. 537, 543-46 (1972) (contending that the nonreciprocal imposition of risk is a factor in
various cases' imposition of strict liability); Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liabil-
ity and Common Law Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1285, 1289 (2001) (arguing that enter-
prises that benefit from their activities should bear strict liability for causing harms characteristic
of the activity); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STun. 1, 2-3 (1980)
(explaining that strict liability can affect activity levels whereas negligence liability tends to affect
only safety levels).
276 [Vol. 61:271
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volve more cost and time than showing that the defendant was in-
volved in a particular activity for which strict liability is imposed.
Expert testimony is more likely to be required or permitted to prove
negligence than to prove the defendant's involvement in such an activ-
ity. Evidence of compliance with, or violation of, a customary practice
is admissible because it is relevant to negligence, but it is unlikely to
be relevant in a strict liability action. Because an unexcused violation
of an applicable safety statute constitutes negligence, whether a stat-
ute was violated may be at issue in negligence but not in strict liability
cases. Imposing strict liability makes all of these issues irrelevant, as
there is no need to gather evidence necessary to determine at trial
how the defendant acted, whether the defendant complied with a cus-
tom or violated a statute, or whether the defendant was negligent in
some other way. And there is no need to occupy a trial with these
factual questions; accordingly, trials may be shorter or may not even
need to occur. Strict liability may therefore reduce litigation costs in
the category of cases in which the cost of making the factual findings
necessary to resolve the relevant negligence issues would otherwise be
substantial.
Further, because it is potentially more fact intensive, there is a
greater risk of error in making the negligence determination than in
determining whether the facts necessary to support strict liability have
been proved. In strict liability, for example, there may be a need only
to determine whether the defendant used explosives or whether bod-
ies of water are common in the area in which a reservoir burst. These
factual determinations tend to produce less error. In negligence, by
contrast, the care with which the defendant acted is at issue. Such
questions are probably more prone to error in fact-finding. Therefore,
parties who were not negligent may be found liable, and parties who
were in fact negligent may be found not to have been negligent. Such
errors may have a variety of undesirable effects: the fact that the law
does not accomplish what it purports to do may undermine respect for
the law; there may be overdeterrence or underdeterrence of future
actors because of the over-imposition or under-imposition of liability;
and like cases may not be treated alike. In contrast, if strict liability is
imposed in the category of cases in which information or error costs
are likely to be comparatively high, these deficiencies may be
reduced. 20
20. The reduction of information and error costs is an instrumental goal of the sort that rights
theorists rule out of consideration. See GoLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 1, at 65 (arguing
that deterring accidents and compensating victims are effects of imposing tort liability but not
"functions" of tort law). Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear what rights theorists would have to
2012]1 277
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B. Influencing Activity-Level and Research Decisions
Exercising reasonable care does not eliminate the risk of injury.
Other things being equal, therefore, the more a party engages in an
activity, even if she exercises reasonable care, the more often injury or
damage will result. The threat of liability for negligence thus gener-
ates no incentive to determine whether it would be more sensible to
engage in less of the activity because exercising reasonable care will
insulate a party from any liability for injury or damage that results
from engaging in the activity. In theory, liability in negligence could
be imposed for engaging in too much of an activity, albeit with reason-
able care.21 In practice, however, negligence liability is rarely imposed
for engaging in an excessive level of activity.22 A party who drives
say about whether reducing information and error costs could ever help to justify the imposition
of strict liability. Suppose that injuries caused by a particular activity (1) are almost always
caused by negligence, but that (2) determining whether there was negligence in any particular
instance would be costly and subject to considerable error. The availability of res ipsa loquitur
would not always or necessarily solve this problem because defendants would still be free to
introduce potentially extensive evidence showing that they were not negligent and juries would
still be free to find that defendants were not negligent.
Ernest Weinrib argues that imposing strict liability in cases satisfying the first condition is
appropriate on corrective justice grounds, without making any reference to information or error
costs. See WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 189-90. But the fact that imposing such liability is appropri-
ate does not necessarily mean that corrective justice requires it. As long as either approach was
acceptable, it is uncertain whether Weinrib would permit the choice between strict liability and
negligence to be influenced by the magnitude of these potential costs. Similarly, although John
Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky deny that strict liability is "tort" liability, they do not seem to
rule out imposing strict liability in all instances. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 1, at
267. Nor do they seem committed, as a normative matter, to imposing liability in all cases where
a civil wrong has been committed. The question then becomes whether other factors, such as
information and error costs, might incline Goldberg and Zipursky to support or oppose imposing
liability when doing either would otherwise be acceptable to them.
My hunch is that, were the choice between two otherwise acceptable liability rules, rights
theorists such as Weinrib and Goldberg and Zipursky might deny that reducing information or
error costs is or should be a goal or function of tort liability, but that they might consider the
existence of these costs to be acceptable practical considerations and would not contend that the
costs are or should be irrelevant to the formulation of tort liabilities. See, e.g., Goldberg &
Zipursky, supra note 7, at 1158 (recognizing, in a discussion about the objective standard of
negligence, "that judges and legislators should avoid resting legal determinations on questions
that are difficult to adjudicate"). For this reason, I think that these rights theorists might well
permit consideration of information or error costs in deciding whether to adopt a rule imposing
strict liability for harm caused by a particular category of activity; in deciding whether to impose
a particular form of negligence liability; or in identifying the particular legal wrongs that should
be subject to negligence liability.
21. In my view, a level of activity could be considered negligently excessive if the marginal
costs of engaging in that level of activity were greater than the marginal benefits that resulted
from the activity.
22. See ABRAHAM, supra note 9, at 171. I am using the notion of a "level of activity" to mean
how much or often an actor engages in an activity. Stephen Gilles has usefully distinguished
among (1) the decision to engage in an activity at all; (2) the decision to engage in it under
certain circumstances; and (3) the decision about how much or how often to engage in it. He
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safely is not held liable in negligence for having driven too many miles
during the week in which he is involved in an automobile accident; oil
companies are not held liable in negligence for drilling too many wells
as long as the wells are not drilled in a negligent manner.
Threatening to impose strict liability for injury or damage resulting
from engaging in an activity can therefore create an additional incen-
tive. Because a party will be held liable even for harm that results
when it exercises reasonable care, liability costs can be reduced by
engaging in less of the activity or partially or fully substituting a differ-
ent, cost-effective activity. Businesses that previously delivered goods
to their customers may find it cost-effective to deliver less often or to
deliver through a third party such as UPS or FedEx. Restaurants that
previously sold both hamburgers and fish cakes may find that, if they
are strictly liable for injuries caused by the food they sell, risking lia-
bility for harm caused by bones in their fish cakes is not cost-effective.
They may therefore stop selling fish cakes. Alternatively, if the busi-
nesses continue to sell fish cakes but their prices rise to take account
of this increased liability, customers may buy fewer fish cakes and
more hamburgers, thus changing the restaurants' activity levels. In
short, either the parties who are threatened with strict liability or
those who deal with these parties may have increased incentives to
consider whether to reduce their activity levels or to substitute less
costly activities for more costly ones.
The prospect that activity levels may be reduced not by those
threatened with liability, but by their potential victims, suggests the
fundamental point that, in a sense, there is always strict liability. Ei-
ther the injurer is strictly liable or the injurer is liable only for negli-
gently caused harm and the victim bears the cost of nonnegligently
caused harm.23 In effect, the victim is strictly liable for harm caused
by some of her own choices and therefore has activity-level incentives
analogous to those that the injurer would have if it were strictly liable.
The choice, therefore, is not whether to impose liability only for negli-
gence or also to impose strict liability for nonnegligently caused harm,
but whether to impose strict liability on the injurer or on the victim.
From the activity-level standpoint, this insight helps explain why
some activities are subject to strict liability and why others are gov-
erned by negligence. Strict liability should be imposed when potential
injurers' activity levels are likely to have more impact on accident
argues that negligence law often addresses whether either of the first two decisions is negligent
but rarely addresses the third, which is the sense in which I am using the notion. See Gilles,
supra note 6, at 332-36.
23. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 1, at 1065.
2012] 279
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rates than potential victims' activity levels.24 In addition, there is little
or no need for strict liability on the part of either potential injurers or
potential victims when the exercise of reasonable care, coupled with
the defense of contributory or comparative negligence, is sufficient to
eliminate the risk of most accidents.25 For example, if virtually all au-
tomobile accidents are caused by negligence, then imposing liability
based on negligence alone will create sufficient incentives for accident
reduction, and strict liability will not be necessary.
Similarly, parties threatened with strict liability have a greater in-
centive than those who are liable only for negligence to investigate
alternatives that will reduce their liability costs. If a substitute activity
is not immediately feasible, investing in research that will identify or
invent a substitute activity may be cost-effective. The parties in the
best position to decide whether to perform research are sometimes
potential injurers, sometimes potential victims, and sometimes there is
little prospect that more research will be performed by either injurers
or victims. Moreover, whether it is worthwhile to invest in research
and development is often uncertain because the results are not known
in advance. But the point is that, whatever research and development
incentives there may be, in certain settings they may be greater under
strict liability.
C. Promoting Insurance of Losses
A third argument for strict liability rests on distributional, rather
than cost-reduction or incentive-creating, considerations. We saw
above that, in a sense, there is always either injurer strict liability or
victim strict "liability" for the costs of nonnegligently caused acci-
dents. Strict liability might be imposed because the injurer is in the
best position to insure or otherwise broadly distribute the costs of
nonnegligently caused accidents.
The cost of nonnegligently caused injuries must be borne by either
injurers or victims. If those in a particular category of injurers are
generally more likely to be better insurers of these costs, then their
superiority in this respect is an argument for imposing strict liability
on them.26 For example, blasters may be better situated to purchase
24. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTiON To LAW AND ECONOMICS 54 (3d ed.
2003); SHAVELL, supra note 6, at 29.
25. See SHAVELL, supra note 6, at 24.
26. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 9, at 173-74 (noting that injurers generally, but not al-
ways, will be superior insurers); see also GuiDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 248
(1970) (observing that the breadth of the insurance categories that will actually bear costs de-
pends on the amount of differentiation among categories).
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liability insurance, or to raise the cost of their services, than their oc-
casional individual victim is able to purchase health and disability in-
surance. On the other hand, if particular categories of victims are
likely to be superior insurers of the costs of nonnegligently caused
accidents, then this is an argument against imposing strict liability.
Capacity to insure depends in part on knowledge of the nature and
probability of the risks posed by an activity. Because such knowledge
is also a factor, along with the capacity to control risk, in an actor's
ability to influence whether accidents occur, insuring capacity will
sometimes, though not always, be congruent with activity-level
considerations. 27
D. Satisfying Norms of Responsibility
The last cluster of arguments for strict liability turns on the exis-
tence of some norm of responsibility for harm-causing conduct. One
version of this approach is the venerable "benefit" theory developed
by Francis H. Bohlen,28 which has been more recently been ex-
pounded by Gregory Keating.29 The notion at the core of this theory
is that those who benefit from engaging in an activity should rightly
bear the costs associated with the activity. The benefit theory leads its
proponents to support strict enterprise liability on the ground that the
owners, employees, and customers of enterprises benefit from their
activities. At this high level of generality, the benefit theory cannot
decide individual cases. 30 Standing alone, the benefit theory cannot
differentiate among the different enterprises that derive benefits from
activities that result in harm. Additionally, it cannot explain why en-
terprises should be held strictly liable to their own customers, who are
both beneficiaries and potential victims of enterprise activity. For an-
swers to these questions, reference to incentive-based or insurance-
based arguments is likely to be necessary.
A quite different version of a rights-oriented norms approach has
been developed at length by John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky.
27. The exception would be cases in which an actor has little or no ability to control a risk or
to conduct research that might identify ways of controlling it, but has superior knowledge of the
risk and is therefore likely to be a superior insurer of that risk.
28. See generally Francis H. Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort,
53 Am. L. REG. 209, 273, 337 (1905).
29. Keating, supra note 19, at 1289.
30. Keating subsequently argued that strict liability must be justified not only by the benefit
theory, but also by showing that the extra burden that strict liability places on injurers is less
than what results when victims must bear losses that are nonnegligently caused. See generally
Gregory C. Keating, Rawlsian Fairness and Regime Choice in the Law of Accidents, 72 FORD-
HAM L. Rav. 1857 (2004).
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These two theorists reject the notion that negligence liability redresses
only moral wrongs. They contend that negligence liability provides
civil recourse for the commission of a variety of wrongs and that many
instances of what others (including myself) might call strict liability
actually involve legal wrongs that fit comfortably within the normative
structure of negligence. 31 What makes these instances wrongs, even
when they are not moral wrongs, is that they involve a breach of a
relational norm linking the victim and injurer.
There is, in my view, an understandable ambiguity about exactly
what renders conduct legally wrongful under this theory when the
conduct is not morally wrongful. Zipursky, writing alone, describes
reasonable care as "civil competence" and negligence as the failure to
satisfy this standard. 32 Writing together, Goldberg and Zipursky ar-
gue that legally wrongful conduct displays a series of characteristics
"defined in terms of success rather than best efforts." 33 Unlike in
traditional strict liability, we think that defendants should not, or at
least wish that they would not, have behaved as they did. But, unlike
the negligence cases in which the defendant has been (in my terms)
careless, foolish, or selfish, we recognize that there may not have been
anything that these defendants could have done to avoid behaving as
they did. Nonetheless, they are answerable for negligence.
31. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 7, at 1144.
32. Zipursky, supra note 10, at 2006.
33. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 7, at 1157.
The first feature of negligence law that connects it to the idea of wrongs is that it
consists in large part of norms enjoining people not to act (or to act) in certain ways
with respect to certain interests of others. . . .
Second, victims of these norm violations are likely to regard themselves as having
been wronged and tend to have concomitant feelings of resentment and blame in
response....
Third, and connecting the first two points, various systems and practices of education
and norm reinforcement exist that involve identifying norms of careful conduct, identi-
fying transactions in which the norm has been violated with respect to some person,
and then permitting, sanctioning, or facilitating a response by the victim that involves
isolating the norm-violator and subjecting such person to adverse treatment. ...
Fourth, the language of wrongs fits quite naturally with negligence law's core idea
that one has a duty-is literally obligated-to refrain from acting toward others in cer-
tain ways, and correlatively, with the idea that others have the right not to be acted
upon in such ways. . ..
Finally, the issue of whether an individual has wronged another generates a series of
questions regarding how the wrongdoer should be treated. At a minimum, tortious
behavior such as negligence stands to harm the wrongdoer's reputation. This conse-
quence goes hand in hand with the opprobrium that accompanies the determination
that a person has acted negligently toward another.
Id. at 1154-56.
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Keating, Goldberg, Zipursky, and other rights-oriented theorists34
all contend that liability is imposed not for instrumental reasons, but
because of the normative relation between certain injurers and certain
victims. The content and breadth of this relation and what constitutes
norm-triggering behavior may vary from theory to theory, but for
each theory, the basis of what I call strict, or at least stricter, liability is
(or should be) that an obligation of responsibility runs between in-
jurer and victim that supports the imposition of liability even in the
absence of moral fault.
IV. THREE FORMS OF STRICT LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE
There are a number of examples of strict liability in negligence that
exhibit slightly different characteristics.35 In this Part, I discuss three
examples of strict liability in negligence that are important doctrines
in accident law, explain the sense in which each doctrine imposes strict
liability, and analyze the major instrumental and rights-based argu-
ments for these doctrines.
A. The Objective Standard
Reasonable care is judged by an objective standard. In general, the
particular abilities and characteristics of the defendant 36 are not rele-
vant.37 The result is that a defendant who does not have the ability to
exercise reasonable care, who can only exercise reasonable care at
greater burden to himself than is socially or economically cost-
effective, or who benefits from exercising less than reasonable care to
such an extent that it is not socially or economically cost-effective for
him to exercise reasonable care is nonetheless held liable for negli-
gence. In these instances, the defendant is not morally at fault, has
not violated the Learned Hand conception of negligence, or both. Im-
posing liability under these circumstances amounts to imposing some-
34. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 19, at 151; Fletcher, supra note 19, at 537-38.
35. In addition to the examples I discuss, res ipsa loquitur, respondeat superior, liability for
breach of a nondelegable duty, and joint and several liability for a single, theoretically divisible
but practically indivisible harm exhibit some feature of strict liability. See generally James
Goudkamp, The Spurious Relationship Between Moral Blameworthiness and Liability for Negli-
gence, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 343 (2004) (discussing some of these other examples).
36. For simplicity I will refer in the remainder of this Article mainly to the defendant or to
defendants, whereas I could accurately refer to both plaintiffs and defendants. Although plain-
tiffs are also judged by an objective standard, there is a longstanding question in the literature
whether they should be or already are so judged in practice. See, e.g., Fleming James, Jr., The
Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16 Mo. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1951).
37. The seminal case on point is Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P.) 492.
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thing like strict liability. That is, although the defendant is described
as negligent, he is without fault.38
One of the earliest justifications for the objective standard was
given by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who observed "the impossibility
of nicely measuring a man's powers and limitations."39 Today, one
may interpret that observation as arguing that the desirability of re-
ducing what we now call information and error costs justifies the ob-
jective standard. The cost of fine-tuning the negligence determination
to take into account small variations in the abilities of different indi-
viduals would be prohibitively high. Because abilities are often subtle,
the accuracy of such determinations, even if making them would not
unduly increase litigation costs, would be subject to question. Thus,
an objective standard is more attractive. The strict liability compo-
nent of the objective standard is a means of avoiding the high cost of
and uncertainty in determining what Holmes called the "powers and
limitations" of each individual defendant. 40 Instead, the parties need
only direct their evidence toward, and the finder of fact need only
compare the conduct of the defendant to, the objective standard of
reasonable care.
There is more involved in the objective standard, however, than
merely minimizing information and error costs. As noted earlier,
strict liability has greater capacity than negligence to influence activity
levels.41 In negligence, it is rare for the plaintiff to contend, and al-
most impossible to prove, that the defendant engaged in an unreason-
ably high amount of the activity that caused the plaintiff harm.42
Typically we do not have easily ascertainable norms about activity
levels,4 3 understood as the amount or magnitude of engagement in an
38. There only a few exceptions to the objective standard. There is some concession to the
young when they are engaged in children's activities, but they are judged by the objective stan-
dard when engaging in adult activities. See, e.g., Daniels v. Evans, 224 A.2d 63, 64-66 (N.H.
1966). Limitations resulting from significant physical disabilities (blindness is the recurring ex-
ample) may be taken into account, but only if it was reasonable for someone with that disability
to engage in the activity giving rise to harm. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 32, at 175-76.
Mental disabilities are less likely to be taken into account, probably because they are more
susceptible to fraudulent proof and because applying the objective standard gives the guardians
of those with severe mental disabilities a greater incentive to supervise them. ABRAHAM, supra
note 9, at 59-60.
39. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 108 (1881).
40. Id. For an argument that Holmes considered the objective standard to be something like
strict liability, see DAVID ROSENBERG, THE HIDDEN HOLMES: His THEORY OF TORTS IN His-
TORY 129 (1995) (referring to "his pathbreaking if cryptic explanation" of the standard's strict
liability effect).
41. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text
42. See ABRAHAM, supra note 9, at 171.
43. See id. at 171-72.
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activity. Moreover, even if we had such norms, it would often be diffi-
cult to prove a causal connection between engaging in an excessive
amount of an activity and the harm suffered by the plaintiff.44 Even if
the defendant had driven fewer miles that week, it would be uncertain
whether he would have been driving at the time of the accident with
the plaintiff. Proving a causal connection between an untaken safety
precaution and the plaintiff's injury is much simpler than proving the
causal connection between an excessive activity level and the plain-
tiff's injury.
The threat of liability under the objective standard, however, can
create an incentive for certain defendants to consider whether to ad-
just their activity levels. A potential defendant threatened with liabil-
ity under a standard with which he cannot comply has the incentive to
consider whether to reduce his level of injury-causing activity to the
point at which the marginal benefit of any additional activity and the
marginal cost of additional liability that would result from that addi-
tional activity are equal. Imposing liability in negligence under an ob-
jective standard has the potential to produce precisely this incentive
for accident reduction for individuals who would otherwise be held
not to have been negligent.
Those who find it impossible to comply with the objective standard
or whose costs of compliance are prohibitively high are nonetheless
held liable for failure to comply with that standard.4 5 In effect, they
are encouraged to decide what activity level is optimal for them be-
cause it would be too costly or too likely to produce error to make this
determination through litigation under a subjective standard. 4 6 These
parties are given the incentive to determine, given the threat of liabil-
ity, whether they would be better off reducing the level of the injury-
causing activity in which they engage. The "hasty and awkward" man,
whose slips and falls Holmes found "no less troublesome to his neigh-
bors than if they sprang from guilty neglect," 4 7 is encouraged to de-
cide whether it would be better for him to do less walking and instead
44. See Gilles, supra note 6, at 333.
45. Interestingly, the objective standard results in liability that is suboptimal for those who
gain sufficient benefits to make noncompliance worthwhile for them. From the instrumental
standpoint, this treatment is just another manifestation of the cost and difficulty that comes from
determining, case by case, whether a party was subjectively negligent.
46. See Warren F. Schwartz, Objective and Subjective Standards of Negligence: Defining the
Reasonable Person to Induce Optimal Care and Optimal Populations of Injurers and Victims, 78
GEo. L.J. 241, 242 (1989) (asserting that both the objective and subjective standards attempt to
"induc[e] each person who engages in an activity to take what is optimal care for that person").
47. HOLMES, supra note 39, at 108.
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take mechanized transportation or stay at home and have people
come to see him.
However, the extent to which such individuals have the capacity to
react to the incentives created by the threat of liability under the ob-
jective standard should not be exaggerated. The immediate impact of
the objective standard is to impose what amounts to strict liability on
individuals whose capacities are below average. These individuals will
consider changing their activity levels only if they know about the im-
pact that the objective standard will have on them and also are capa-
ble of changing their activity levels in response. I do not doubt that
there are some settings in which the incentives created by the objec-
tive standard actually have a real impact. For example, those whose
substandard driving results from their clumsiness or inability to con-
centrate for substantial periods may well drive less so as to reduce the
probability that they will be involved in accidents that generate in-
creases in their automobile liability insurance premiums (as well as
reduce the risk of injury to themselves and others). But in general, I
am skeptical that the behavior of individuals with below-average abili-
ties, who also typically are not repeat players in the tort system, is
much affected by the strict liability component of the objective
standard.
On the other hand, given the way in which vicarious liability under
the doctrine of respondeat superior operates, it may well be that the
principal behavioral impact of the objective standard is to influence
employers' activity levels. Regardless of whether the objective stan-
dard influences ordinary but below-average individuals through the
threat of individual liability, the presence of such individuals in an em-
ployer's workforce will increase the employer's potential liability. As
a result, employers will have an incentive either to arrive at a division
of labor that reduces the involvement of such individuals in activities
most likely to result in liability or, if this is not feasible,48 to adjust the
level of the activity in question.
Like instrumental theories, rights theories have no quarrel with the
objective standard, though they deny that it involves any strict liabil-
ity. Ernest Weinrib argues that a subjective standard would ignore the
correlative nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant and thereby create a transactional inequality between the par-
ties, which would violate corrective justice. 4 9 Jules Coleman calls the
objective standard an instance of "fault in the doing" rather than
48. For example, anti-discrimination laws might prohibit such a division of labor or below-
average individuals might not always be identifiable by employers.
49. WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 178-79.
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"fault in the doer."5 0 Goldberg and Zipursky contend that one can act
wrongfully, in the sense I described earlier of having committed what
they call a legal wrong,5' "even though one lacks the ability to have
acted otherwise." 52 The inability to comply with the objective stan-
dard is simply "compliance luck."53 Moreover, they recognize that a
subjective standard would create fact-finding difficulties, 54 and they
therefore come close to conceding that the objective standard has the
advantage of reducing information and error costs. Additionally, the
benefit theory developed by Bohlen and revived by Keating, while it
has nothing to say directly about the objective standard, would seem
to support the standard in cases where respondeat superior results in
liability on the part of the employment enterprise for employee con-
duct that breaches the objective standard.
Avihay Dorfman has recently proposed a different justification for
the objective standard.5 5 Dorfman argues that the objective standard
is a means of showing people equal concern and respect. Under a
subjective standard, those with weaknesses or disabilities would have
to assert and prove these weaknesses in court. This would be a poten-
tially demeaning experience. In contrast, under an objective standard,
those who are not capable of complying with the standard or whose
costs of compliance are prohibitively high are not put in a position
that encourages them to prove their own deficiencies. In this respect,
everyone is treated with equal concern and respect under the objec-
tive standard.56
50. COLEMAN, supra note 12, at 333.
51. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 7, at 1161.
52. Id. at 1150.
53. Id. at 1143-44.
54. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 1, at 86 ("[T]he inner mental state of an actor can be
difficult for the fact finder to ascertain.").
55. See generally Avihay Dorfman, Reasonable Care: Equality from Beginning to End (Tel
Aviv Univ. Faculty of Law, Working Paper, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562576.
56. As Dorfman acknowledges throughout his paper, however, and as the theory of strict
liability suggests, these individuals may then find it in their interest to engage in less of the
activity that generates their liability than those without these deficiencies. The effect of applying
the objective standard to them is that formally they are treated as equals, but that in practice
they are discouraged from engaging in activities in which they would otherwise engage. These
individuals are therefore at a greater disadvantage than those who are not substandard. Simi-
larly, to the extent that these individuals' employers bear liability for their negligence under
respondeat superior, the individuals may find that they have less access to liability-vulnerable
jobs than individuals who can comply with the objective standard.
The probability that such individuals will be insured against most of their potential personal
liabilities may mitigate the disadvantage that the objective standard imposes on them in their
private, as distinguished from their employed, capacity. If they incur above-average liabilities in
their personal lives, their experience-rated liability insurance premiums are likely to increase.
This is a decided disadvantage, and the amount of this increase will be the price they pay to
2012] 287
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
B. The Perfect-Compliance Requirement
The reasonably prudent person always exercises reasonable care.
Perfect compliance with this standard is required. If reasonable care
requires driving no more than thirty miles per hour, driving thirty-five
miles per hour for just a few seconds is, or may be found to be, negli-
gent. If reasonable care requires keeping a lookout for cars that may
be stopped ahead, even a momentary lapse of attention is, or may be
found to be, negligent. As A. P. Herbert once put the point with hu-
mor that had a core of truth, the reasonably prudent man is an "odi-
ous" creature precisely because he is never negligent.57
Mark Grady has called negligence of this sort "compliance error"
and argued that this form of negligence is at the heart of cases invok-
ing the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.58 Of course, compliance error also
figures in many negligence cases in which there is direct evidence of
noncompliance and res ipsa loquitur is not relevant. Whether it can
only be inferred that the defendant failed in some way to comply with
the duty to exercise reasonable care or the particular failure to comply
is specifically proved, the defendant is negligent if she falls short of
perfect compliance. For rights theories, this appears to mean that
even occasional or rare failures to exercise the requisite level of civil
competence are wrongful and therefore negligent. 59 And for instru-
mental theories, less-than-perfect compliance is negligent even when
the cost of achieving perfect compliance is not worth its benefits.
It seems obvious that the perfect-compliance requirement some-
times results in what amounts to strict liability. If perfect compliance
is impossible, then there will be instances in which the defendant has
exercised all the care that is reasonable-indeed, all the care that is
possible-but is nonetheless liable for harm that his conduct has
caused. This can be called "negligence" or a "legal wrong," but for
practical purposes it is strict liability.
One explanation for this pocket of strict liability in negligence over-
laps with the explanation for the objective standard: the cost of ac-
quiring the information necessary to determine whether any particular
maintain prior activity levels. But this disadvantage is a less public, and therefore different, form
of inequality than they would incur if a subjective standard applied to them and if their liability
insurers required them to assert their deficiencies as a defense in negligence suits against them.
This might be required under a "cooperation" clause, which is included in most liability insur-
ance policies. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 716 (5th ed.
2010).
57. A. P. HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAw 12-17 (1st Am. ed. 1930).
58. Grady, supra note 6, at 908.
59. See, e.g., Zipursky, supra note 10, at 2018 (arguing that, even without any additional facts,
"[a] waiter's clumsy dropping of a bowl of hot soup on a patron is paradigmatic of negligence").
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compliance error was the result of the failure to exercise reasonable
care would be prohibitively high. Even if we were willing to have a
rule, for example, that keeping a proper lookout at an intersection
ninety-nine times out of one hundred constituted reasonable care, it
would rarely be possible to determine whether a driver had complied
with this standard. The evidence, at best, would show whether the
driver was keeping a proper lookout at the time of, or during a speci-
fied brief period prior to, an accident. But there would rarely be evi-
dence of how careful the defendant had been as he approached the
previous ninety-nine intersections.
Perhaps partly for this reason, the notion of reasonable care does
not presuppose that there is any particular period for assessing the
quality of the defendant's conduct or even that there is necessarily a
relevant period of assessment. Rather, the issue is whether the defen-
dant was exercising reasonable care in connection with the particular
act or omission that caused the plaintiff's harm. Other noncausally
related acts or omissions are likely to be irrelevant. This formulation
does not automatically rule out considering the reasonableness of the
defendant's conduct for an extended period prior to the event that
culminates in harm to the plaintiff. There is no categorical rule that
would exclude as inadmissible, for example, evidence that the defen-
dant had approached the previous ninety-nine intersections carefully,
although it is likely that such evidence would either be excluded or
admitted only as tending to show how the defendant approached the
100th intersection. It is clear, however, that such evidence is not re-
quired; the defendant's conduct in the period prior to the allegedly
negligent act or omission is not ordinarily significant.
In one sense, this is just another way of saying that there is strict
liability for imperfect compliance. If the defendant's conduct consists
of a series of iterated precautions, his exercise of reasonable care in
connection with precautions taken in an earlier iteration is irrelevant
to whether the defendant is considered negligent in connection with a
later iteration.
But in a different sense, the tendency to focus only on the act or
omission culminating in the harm at issue is an effort to ensure that
negligence litigation is concerned with the defendant's conduct rather
than the defendant's character or habits. 60 That is, the longer the rele-
vant period for assessing whether the defendant exercised reasonable
care, the more concern there will be with the aggregate quality of the
defendant's actions over time, as distinguished from the particular act
60. See Grady, supra note 6, at 905.
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or omission that allegedly caused the plaintiff harm. And the greater
the concern with the aggregate quality of the defendant's actions over
time, the greater the tendency of the inquiry will be to consider
whether the defendant himself is a reasonable person, all things con-
sidered, rather than whether the particular harm-causing act or omis-
sion of the defendant was negligent. Imposing liability for imperfect
compliance helps to focus the inquiry on this particular harm-causing
conduct rather than on the defendant's overall character.
Another effect of this standard of perfect compliance, rather than a
general-reasonableness-over-a-period-of-time standard, is to create
pressure on activity levels. Potential defendants are threatened with
liability for imperfect compliance despite having exercised all the care
that is reasonable for them. It will therefore be in their interest to
consider adjusting their activity levels or (what amounts to the same
thing) substituting activities so as to reduce the instances in which they
fail to achieve perfect compliance with the standards applicable to the
activity in which they would otherwise engage.
In contrast to the objective standard, however, which I suggested is
likely to have a limited impact on substandard individuals' activity
levels, the threat of liability for imperfect compliance may well have
considerable impact. First, most people intuitively understand that
they are liable for imperfect compliance no matter how nearly perfect
their compliance has been in the past. They realize, for example, that
if they are speeding and are involved in an accident, their immediately
preceding or longstanding lawful behavior is irrelevant. Similarly,
most people understand that if someone slips and is injured on their
icy sidewalk, the fact that on all past occasions they have carefully
removed all snow and ice will not excuse them from liability if it was
negligent not to remove the ice this time. That is, people know that
harm caused by compliance failures is part of the cost of driving or
home-owning-or at least part of the cost of automobile or home-
owner's liability insurance. Because of the general sense that greater
involvement in an activity risks greater liability, activity-level incen-
tives may follow. Families may not buy a third car to be driven by
their teenagers and may thereby limit the amount of miles their teen-
agers drive. And homeowners may hire others who are more capable
than they are to shovel snow from their sidewalks rather than do it
themselves.
Second, as with the objective standard, the most significant impact
of liability for imperfect compliance may come through employers'
incentives. If, because of the perfect-compliance rule, there is an irre-
ducible level of negligence liability that employers incur in connection
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with particular activities, they will have an incentive to take this po-
tential liability into account in fixing activity levels. Instead of deliver-
ing goods on company-owned trucks, retailers may decide that
shipping by a commercial carrier costs less, taking into account their
accident costs under the perfect-compliance rule. Thus, even if em-
ployees are completely unaware of the perfect-compliance rule, their
employers may be affected by it.
The perfect-compliance rule is congruent with rights-oriented theo-
ries as well. For Weinrib and Coleman, presumably the rule is subject
to essentially the same analysis as the objective standard. That is, re-
quiring perfect compliance is consistent with Weinrib's concern for the
transactional equality of the parties 61 and with Coleman's notion that
sometimes the fault is in the doing rather than in the doer. 62 Similarly,
Goldberg and Zipursky would presumably say that the perfect-
compliance rule imposes liability for a legal wrong based on negli-
gence law's "norms defined in terms of success rather than best ef-
forts" 63 and is therefore uncontroversial.
I am skeptical that the intuition behind this notion-that the
perfect-compliance requirement is not strict liability because victims
regard themselves as having been wronged by breaches of the norm of
success-is satisfied by all the cases in which we would say that the
defendant was negligent even though not morally wrong. For exam-
ple, although most people would regard themselves as being wronged
by a driver's occasional failure to pay attention to the traffic in front
of him, I am not at all sure that people would always feel wronged
when Zipursky's hypothetical waiter dropped a tray on them.64 Re-
61. See WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 178-79.
62. See COLEMAN, supra note 12, at 333.
63. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 7, at 1157.
64. See Zipursky, supra note 10, at 2017-18. Res ipsa loquitur also would not change these
results because Zipursky seems to be asserting that the waiter's dropping the tray is always
negligent or that a jury can always find him to be negligent, not that liability is imposed because
dropping the tray usually is negligent. See id. at 2017. Nevertheless, there is a good deal that is
appealing about the Goldberg and Zipursky analysis, but I think that in their effort to find a
suitable generalization about what characterizes all of negligence, they necessarily under-
emphasize what distinguishes different forms of negligence. Some negligent conduct bears a far
more attenuated relationship to what is wrongful, in ordinary parlance, than other negligent
conduct. To say that a social or cultural norm of success underwrites the imposition of liability
for negligence in the situation involving the waiter is just slightly too strong. Unlike in tradi-
tional strict liability, it is true that we think that waiters should not, or at least wish that they
would not, ever drop trays on customers. But, unlike the negligence cases in which the defen-
dant has been careless, foolish, or selfish, we recognize that there may not have been anything
that the waiter could have done to avoid dropping the tray in this case. To say that the waiter is
subject to a norm of success, that he was "clumsy," or that he has committed a legal wrong is
more nearly to label the outcome of a suit against him than to explain why he is liable.
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gardless of whether the term "legal wrong" adequately describes the
waiter's conduct, it seems clear that some such "legal wrongs" are
more wrongful than others.65 If this were not the case, Goldberg and
Zipursky would not have felt it necessary to devote an entire article to
defending the proposition that rules such as the perfect-compliance
requirement fit comfortably within the normative structure of negli-
gence law.
C. The Thin-Skull Rule
A negligent defendant is liable to a foreseeable plaintiff even if the
amount of harm the plaintiff suffered was unforeseeable. This liability
is so firmly established that it has acquired its own name-the "thin-
skull" or "eggshell skull" rule.6 6
This rule adopts what, in my view, amounts to strict liability. It is
true that the thin-skull rule is nominally a rule about damages and not
about the standard of care. In thin-skull cases the defendant was neg-
ligent, but that negligence consists of risking a foreseeable harm to the
plaintiff. The dominant approach to determining the scope of the de-
fendant's liability in negligence is the "harm-within-the-risk test,"
under which a defendant is only liable for foreseeable harm.67 Thin-
skull liability is an exception to the notion that, because it is not negli-
gent to risk what cannot be foreseen, there is no liability for harm that
results from risking unforeseeable harm.68
I recognize that this is not strict liability in the same way that liabil-
ity under the objective standard and perfect-compliance rule is strict.
Defendants would not be considered "negligent" at all in the absence
of these two rules, whereas a defendant held liable under the thin-
skull rule would be negligent and liable for the plaintiff's foreseeable
injuries, even if there were no thin-skull rule. But by definition the
defendant in a thin-skull case is not negligent-is not at fault-with
respect to the plaintiff's unforeseeable injuries. So the liability im-
posed under the thin-skull rule is, in effect, strict liability for being
65. Goldberg and Zipursky themselves recognize this. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note
7, at 1167 n.157 (noting that not all negligence is "highly culpable" and suggesting that victims of
torts that "do not carry the full weight associated with other forms of wrongdoing" might be
"entitled to less substantial redress").
66. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 31
cmt. a (2010) (describing the thin-skull rule); accord DOBBS, supra note 2, § 188, at 464-65.
67. See ABRAHAM, supra note 9, at 126-28 (describing the harm-within-the-risk test).
68. Blyth v. Co. of Proprietors of the Birmingham Water Works, (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047
(Ex.) 1047 (stating the foreseeability requirement); see also Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v.
Morts Dock & Eng'g Co. (Wagon Mound No. 1), [1961] A.C. 388 at 423 (J.C.) ("For, if it is
asked why a man should be responsible for the natural or necessary or probable consequences of
his act . . . the answer is that . . . he ought to have foreseen them.").
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negligent. In any event, my larger point is not merely that the stan-
dard of care in negligence sometimes amounts to strict liability, but
that the liability ultimately imposed in negligence cases is sometimes
strict. The thin-skull rule is a prime example of this latter
phenomenon.
One explanation for thin-skull liability is a version of the
information-cost explanation. If defendants were liable only for the
amount of harm that was foreseeable, every negligence case would
require resolution of this issue. Of course, in some cases the amount
of harm that was foreseeable is relevant to the negligence determina-
tion itself and therefore is already at issue. But this determination
tends to be an average of sorts-how much harm the failure to take a
particular precaution is likely in general to cause, if it does cause
harm, rather than a precise estimate of the particular amount of harm
that was foreseeable. 69
The very notion of a foreseeable amount of harm-especially bodily
injury-presupposes that there is a "normal" or average degree of vul-
nerability on the part of potential victims. Even setting aside what
may be objectionable in principle about this notion,70 the range of var-
iations in the severity of injury that may be expected to occur around
this "normal" severity, and the accompanying probabilities, would
have to be ingredients in a determination of the amount of injury that
is foreseeable. In the absence of the thin-skull rule, such evidence
would be necessary because the damages recoverable would depend
on the portion of harm the plaintiff suffered falling within the range of
foreseeability. Potentially at issue in every negligence trial, therefore,
would be whether the amount of harm the plaintiff suffered was fore-
seeable. The accompanying information costs would be considerable.
The thin-skull rule saves these costs.
An additional explanation for the strict liability feature of the thin-
skull rule resonates with activity-level and insurance considerations.
This argument is a bit more tentative, but worth considering. If the
amount of harm suffered by the plaintiff was unforeseeable not only
by the defendant but also by the plaintiff, then once the defendant is
liable for risking some harm to the plaintiff, it may well be that supe-
rior activity-level and insurance effects are achieved by holding the
69. See Mosian v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949) ("The injuries are always a variable
within limits, which do not admit of even approximate ascertainment . . . .").
70. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINs, THE MEASURE OF INJURY 180
(2010) ("Unless we are to fault plaintiffs for not experiencing the modal amount of pain and
suffering-that is, for being individuals-there is nothing particularly troubling about variations
in pain and suffering awards . . . .").
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defendant liable for an unforeseeable amount of harm suffered by
that plaintiff. Because the plaintiff (or potential victims in the same
category) is already foreseeable, an unforeseeable amount of harm to
that plaintiff is not, literally, unforeseeable. After all, it is foreseeable
that a foreseeable plaintiff will suffer an unforeseeable-that is, highly
improbable-amount of harm. Consequently, in making activity-level
decisions, potential injurers can take into account the fact that they
will be held liable when foreseeable victims occasionally suffer an
improbably large amount of harm.7 1 When the thin-skull rule is in
force, this low probability of a large amount of harm is also automati-
cally built into actuarial projections based on past losses made for in-
surance purposes. 72
In contrast, when victims know that they are especially at risk of
suffering an amount of harm that is unforeseeable to potential injur-
ers, the activity-level and insurance arguments for thin-skull strict lia-
bility are weaker. For example, in Hammerstein v. Jean Development
West, the plaintiff suffered from diabetes.73 Because of the defen-
dant's negligence in maintaining a fire alarm system, an alarm
sounded, elevators were disabled, and the plaintiff had to evacuate the
fourth floor of his hotel by foot.7 4 In doing so he sprained his ankle.75
As a consequence he limped and developed a blister on his foot.7 6
Because diabetes caused poor circulation in his limbs, the blister be-
came infected and he developed gangrene.77 The possibility that he
might develop gangrene from a blister was certainly far more foresee-
able to the plaintiff, who knew he suffered from diabetes, than it was
to the defendant, if it was foreseeable to the defendant at all. The
plaintiff might well have been the party in the best position to make
the activity-level and insurance decisions in that situation. But the
thin-skull rule still applied,78 in my view because of the assumption
that most thin-skull plaintiffs-understood as everyone who suffers
71. See ABRAHAM, supra note 9, at 136; Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of
Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 95-96 (1975).
72. See ABRAHAM, supra note 56, at 133-35 (noting that past underwriting, namely, claim
payment results, are used to project future losses); C. Robert Morris, Jr., Enterprise Liability and
the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 574 (1961) (describing
how liability insurance actuaries project past results into the future with little regard for what is
actually foreseeable).
73. Hammerstein v. Jean Dev. West, 907 P.2d 975, 975 (Nev. 1995).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 975-76.
76. Id. at 976.
77. Id. at 976.
78. See id. at 978 (upholding the imposition of liability although "[tihe extent of the infection
on Hammerstein's leg may not have been foreseeable").
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more than a foreseeable amount of injury-are not aware of their spe-
cial vulnerability. In this sense, the thin-skull rule operates at a high
level of generality that applies regardless of differential foreseeability
as between plaintiff and defendant except when the plaintiff is consid-
ered contributorily negligent in failing to exercise reasonable care to
protect herself against her special vulnerability.
A strength of the activity-level argument for the thin-skull rule is
that (along with the information-cost explanation) it helps to explain
the distinction between this rule and Palsgraf s zone-of-danger rule,
which declines to impose liability for negligence that results in harm to
a wholly unforeseeable plaintiff.7 9 Why impose strict liability in negli-
gence for an unforeseeable amount of harm to a foreseeable plaintiff,
but not for harm to an unforeseeable plaintiff? A plausible answer is
that there is little or no reason to believe that the activity-level and
insurance effects of imposing liability for harm suffered by unforesee-
able victims will be superior to leaving losses suffered by these victims
where they fall. Under the thin-skull rule, injurers know the universe
of plaintiffs to whom they may be liable (those who are foreseeable)
and can therefore anticipate in rough measure the maximum amount
of liability they may face to these plaintiffs. They have these potential
victims in their sights, so to speak. The number of potential plaintiffs
is finite and, in this sense, foreseeable. By contrast, if the zone-of-
danger rule did not limit liability, negligent injurers would have poten-
tial liability to anyone in the world who happened to be injured as a
result of their negligence. The number of potential plaintiffs, and the
amount of liability that might be imposed for injuring them, would be
unlimited. This would be a much more open-ended threat of liability
and, consequently, would be much more difficult to take into account
in making meaningful activity-level decisions. The argument for im-
posing liability on a negligent defendant for harm suffered by an un-
foreseeable plaintiff is therefore much weaker than the argument for
the thin-skull rule.80
Whereas instrumental theories must stretch a bit to find arguments
for the thin-skull rule, rights theories do not regard the rule as prob-
lematic. As far as I can tell, Weinrib, a prominent rights theorist, does
not even discuss the rule in his explication of strict liability and correc-
tive justice.8' Goldberg and Zipursky say that the idea of "make-
whole compensation" is "a plausible metric for what should count as
79. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928); see also ABRAHAM, supra
note 9, at 132-35 (discussing Palsgraf).
80. See Calabresi, supra note 71, at 93-98 (distinguishing the two rules on this basis).
81. See generally WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 171-203.
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meaningful redress" and that the rule is "broadly compatible with the
idea of tort law as a law of wrongs and redress, among other possibili-
ties." 82 Because their article seeks to explain why liability hinging on
certain forms of "luck," including luck as to the extent of injury suf-
fered by a victim, is consistent with conceiving tort as a law of wrongs,
they may not be required to say anything more.
Their emphasis on the "plausibility" of the thin-skull rule, however,
rather than its superiority or correctness, suggests their own possible
discomfort with it. They come close to contending that the other rules
I have analyzed here are required features of tort as a law of legal
wrongs. But they are quite content to accept the thin-skull rule as
only one of a number of possible approaches to tort damages. 3 And
they go so far as to note in another work that "actual and potential
injustices" may result from the disproportional liability that the rule
permits imposing.8 Part of what may make liability disproportionate,
of course, is that the amount of injury for which liability is imposed
was not reasonably foreseeable. And in this sense, liability imposed
under the thin-skull rule is strict.
V. IMPLICATIONS
My analysis has two implications. The first involves the effect of the
presence of significant amounts of strict, or at least stricter, liability on
the development of tort liability. I think that, in addition to other
explanations that have been offered for the failure of strict liability to
replace negligence in the latter half of the twentieth century8 5 the
presence of these forms of liability helps to explain why negligence
liability managed to maintain its dominance over the last century, de-
spite repeated calls for the expansion of strict liability.
The second implication follows from the fact that, however different
theories of tort liability may describe or explain these instances of
strict liability in negligence, all the major theories tend to approve of
82. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 7, at 1141-42.
83. See id. at 1142-43.
84. See id. at 1143; accord id. at 1167 n.157 (suggesting that less substantial redress might be
available for wrongs that are not highly culpable).
85. See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 286-90 (Expanded ed. 2003) (citing
as explanations the increasing appreciation of public-choice theory, the recognition of the weak-
nesses of expanded products liability, the increasing preference for market solutions, and the
decreasing preference for solutions to injury problems based on government intervention); Gary
T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26
GA. L. REv. 601, 683-99 (1992) (citing as explanations the completion of the tort modernization
agenda, the replacement of liberal judges with conservative ones, the recognition of the adverse
consequences of previous expansions of liability, and the declining academic support for ex-
panded liability).
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them. This concurrence of approval tells us something about the nor-
mative character of accident law. The goals or purposes that accident
law serves, or should serve, may be contested. But when a doctrine
simultaneously satisfies the competing values that very different theo-
ries consider important, the doctrine is much more likely to have sta-
bility and persistence. It may well be, therefore, that for practical
purposes the key question is not what goals accident law serves or
what functions it performs, but whether a doctrine or practice is con-
sistent with a series of different, otherwise competing and contested,
values.
A. Strict Liability and the Dominance of Negligence
The objective standard, the perfect-compliance rule, and the thin-
skull rule are not obscure, little-known doctrines. The objective stan-
dard is one of the first things, and often the very first thing, that tort
students learn about negligence. 86 The perfect-compliance require-
ment probably figures, if only implicitly, in many negligence cases.
And the thin-skull rule, at least by virtue of the evidence that it makes
irrelevant and the issue that it renders moot, has operative signifi-
cance in virtually every case involving bodily injury.
There is naturally going to be far less need for, or pressure to ex-
pand, strict liability when negligence often consists of what amounts to
strict liability. If most inadvertent failures to take a particular reason-
able precaution are considered negligent, for example, then the threat
of liability for negligence will have activity-level effects resembling
outright strict liability. That certainly seems to be what has occurred
in the field of automobile liability. It is a rare automobile accident
that cannot be said to have been caused by the failure to take some
precaution and therefore to result from negligence. In practice we
have something approaching strict liability for automobile accidents.
And if, as Goldberg and Zipursky seem to contend, certain outcomes
that violate a "norm of success" even without proof of failure to take a
precaution are considered negligent, activity-level effects will be even
stronger.
But even if the rules constituting strict liability in negligence had no
effect on primary conduct or on the outcome of negligence cases, their
information-cost-reducing impact would be significant. Because of
these rules, no ordinary negligence case concerns itself in a significant
86. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTs 171 (9th ed. 2008)
(discussing Vaughan v. Menlove first in the materials on negligence); MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROB-
ERT L. RABIN & MICHAEL D. GREEN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 50 (8th ed. 2006) (discuss-
ing a case referring to the objective standard third in the materials on negligence).
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way with the personal capacities of the defendant, with the general
level of care the defendant exercises in his life, or with the physical
weaknesses of the average person as compared to the plaintiff.
The fact that the impact of the rules in this respect is to keep some
things from happening in a tort suit, which would happen in the ab-
sence of the rules, makes their impact very nearly transparent. But
given the frequency at which the rules probably have an impact on
what does not happen in discovery and at trial, it is fair to say that
there is a lot of strict liability in negligence. And given the signifi-
cance of what the rules prevent from happening, it is also fair to say
that the strict liability that exists in negligence has an important im-
pact, even apart from its possible effect on primary conduct and case
outcomes. In one sense, these rules may be mere pockets of strict
liability, but in another sense they are a large and important part of
accident law's actual operation.
I think that the presence of this strict liability in negligence, and the
effects that it has produced, are part of what has enabled negligence to
fend off the expansion of strict liability over a period of a century or
more. Imagine how much more appealing the arguments for broad-
based strict liability would have been if, during this period, defendants
had been judged by a subjective standard, permitted to introduce evi-
dence and avoid liability on the ground that in general they were care-
ful people, and were liable only for the foreseeable amount of injury
and suffering that their victims experienced. And imagine how much
more appealing the arguments for strict liability would have been if
injurers' employers were vicariously liable only if their employees
were liable only on these much more limited bases. If the examples of
strict liability in negligence that I have discussed had not been availa-
ble as alternatives to these hypothetical, liability-limiting doctrines, we
would probably have a lot more of the formal kind of strict liability
than we now have. There certainly would be more calls for adopting
strict liability if it had not by now been adopted.
B. Normative Side Constraints in a World of Contested Goals
One of the striking things about my analysis is the degree to which
instrumental and rights-based theories seem to concur on the norma-
tive attractiveness of the rules I have analyzed. It is one thing for
proponents of these theories to have different descriptions of the
same doctrines. This difference is at the core of the debate over the
last two decades about the nature of tort liability-to oversimplify,
whether tort is a system of corrective justice, civil recourse, deterrence
and compensation, or some combination of these. But it is quite an-
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other thing for virtually everyone to agree that the doctrines that I
have termed strict liability in negligence, however differently they are
described, all are appropriate and desirable.
It is significant that both rights-based and instrumental theories
converge in their normative support for the negligence standard gen-
erally. It is even more significant, however, that they also converge on
the strict liability exceptions within negligence that I have discussed.
These are not randomly selected doctrines, but prominent deviations
that require explanation. If we can say that not only mainstream neg-
ligence, but also the anomalies within it, have widespread normative
support, then we have evidence that this sort of support may be im-
portant to the stability and persistence of tort doctrines.
It is true that the arguments supporting this overlapping consensus
were constructed in order to make sense of, and sometimes to justify,
the doctrines in question. But, this seems to me to be more than mere
circularity. I think that this convergence of support may say some-
thing important about the normative character of tort law-or at least
about the politics of tort law-that has gone under-emphasized in the
debates. I do not wish to engage in an argument about whether this
convergence would appropriately be called part of the normative
"structure" of tort law, whether it is merely a contingent feature of a
body of law that has a noncontingent structure, or whether it is some-
thing else. Suffice it to say that the apparent confluence of normative
support on the merits for the doctrines I have discussed seems to me
to be an important feature of accident law as we know and understand
it actually to be today.
Might it be, therefore, that tort law doctrines can persist and be
stable only if at some level they satisfy both instrumental and rights-
based concerns? If so, how best to describe the normative structure of
tort liability as a whole, or any individual doctrine, might then be re-
garded as a question distinct from whether tort law as a whole, or any
individual doctrine, provides a minimum or requisite level of satisfac-
tion of both instrumental and rights-based concerns. The former
question might be of great interest, but the latter question would also
be of importance.
One way to describe the set of conditions relevant to the latter
question would be to say that both rights-based and instrumental
goals must be served by the tort system as a whole or any particular
doctrine in order to persist and be stable. But this may be too strong a
statement or requirement. A different and perhaps more accurate
view might be that values from one domain are likely to function as
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side constraints on the acceptability of doctrines that are thought prin-
cipally to serve the values of the other domain.
Under this second view, a tort system or doctrine that is understood
mainly to serve the principle of civil recourse or corrective justice will
not survive unless it also satisfies one or more instrumental values-
unless, that is, in some minimally acceptable fashion it also reduces
high information costs, deters accidents by encouraging more safety,
influences activity levels, or promotes the insurance of losses. Con-
versely, neither the tort system nor any particular doctrine will sur-
vive, even if it satisfies instrumental values, unless in some minimal
fashion it also satisfies the demand that tort liability redress the viola-
tion of private rights.87
On this view, it is no surprise that there is so little "traditional"
strict liability because rights-based theories tend to contemplate it
only when there is something like negligence in the background," or
regard it as separate from tort law entirely.89 Even if more strict lia-
bility would satisfy instrumental values, it probably would have less
traction with most rights theories.
This description of tort law's normative character may not please
those who seek, or actually find, philosophical coherence in tort law.
But the description strikes me as coming closer to the way that courts,
lawyers, and many tort scholars think about tort liability than either
pure rights theory or pure instrumental theory. Few courts, lawyers,
or tort scholars would wish for a body of tort law that adequately re-
dressed rights but did not effectively deter, influence activity levels, or
promote the insurance of losses. We hope that in redressing rights,
tort law also does at least one of these things. And few would wish for
a body of tort law that adequately deterred accidents or effectively
promoted insurance but had nothing to do with redressing rights. The
idea that whatever the purposes of accident law, in fashioning its doc-
trines we should not wholly ignore any significant side effects, whether
positive or negative, that are produced by existing doctrines or that
might be produced by alternative doctrines, hardly seems radical.
87. Cf Jules L. Coleman, Epilogue to MARCEL PoNs, RISK AND WRONGS (Diego Martin
Papayannis trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1679554 (dis-
tinguishing between the normative structure and foundational justification of tort law and argu-
ing for the "mixed view" that "part of the justification of tort law" is "the reduction of accident
costs and the deterrence of undesirable conduct").
88. See WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 189 (arguing that the imposition of strict liability for abnor-
mally dangerous activities "carries on the negligence idea")
89. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 1, at 267 (arguing that strictly liability does not
belong in the "department" of tort law).
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If this picture is accurate, it should come as no surprise. After all,
because tort law is a human institution, there is no reason to suppose
that it is philosophically pure or that its structure is perfectly coherent.
And even if tort law once was this way, it no longer is. In this instance
the common law may have worked itself impure.90 And there is no
going back.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have tried to show that there are important doctrines in negligence
law that have a lot in common with strict liability and that these doc-
trines can be understood to serve some of the purposes of strict liabil-
ity. In addition, I have argued that the presence of these forms of
strict liability in negligence helps to explain how negligence has man-
aged to maintain its dominance over a period of more than a century.
If there had not been some strict liability in negligence, there might
well have been less negligence liability and more open and obvious
strict liability. Finally, I have suggested that the confluence of agree-
ment on the normative desirability of these doctrines, even while what
to call them and how to justify them are contested, tells us something
important about the normative character of accident law. Tort law is
more pluralist, in the sense of being subject to mixed side constraints,
than either the instrumentalists or the rights theorists may have
acknowledged.
None of this necessarily suggests anything about whether we should
have more or less negligence liability, strict liability in negligence, or
strict liability. But as I have suggested in other contexts, it does argue
for greater realism about, and a richer understanding of, the actual
character of our system of accident law and the mixture of motives
that it reflects. 91 Achieving a greater understanding of these features
90. See WHrrE, supra note 85, at 233 (arguing that tort law "is not a unified [body of law] but a
complex of diverse wrongs whose policy implications point in different directions"). Similarly, it
seems beside the point to focus exclusively on judge-made accident law when this body of law is
increasingly composed of both common law and statutory reforms of the common law. See
ABRAHAM, supra note 9, at 250-51. Statutory caps on the recovery of pain-and-suffering dam-
ages, for example, were enacted at least in part for instrumental reasons. See id. at 251. But they
probably could not and would not have been enacted unless it were at least arguable that they
were consistent with rights-based understandings of tort liability. For discussion of this and simi-
lar issues, see Christopher J. Robinette, Why Civil Recourse Theory Is Incomplete, 78 TENN. L.
REv. 431 (2011).
91. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Rylands v. Fletcher: Tort Law's Conscience, in ToRTs STo-
RIEs 207, 207 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003) (suggesting that the availa-
bility of strict liability as an alternative to negligence causes us to examine the justifications for
limiting liability to cases in which there was negligence); Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with
Negligence, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1187, 1188 (2001) (arguing that the character of negligence liabil-
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of accident law might even be worthy of the example that Bob Rabin
has set for us.
ity is incompletely recognized and that closer examination "reveals that it is more troubled than
its apparently central place in tort law implies").
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